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URING this Survey period, Texas courts continued to wrestle
with many of the issues that have dominated professional liabil-
ity cases in recent years, including privity/standing issues, causa-
tion, statutes of limitations, jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants,
expert report requirements, fiduciary duties, and insurance coverage.
The courts also continued to resolve those issues-in most cases-in
favor of the defendants.
I. LEGAL MALPRACTICE
A. PLAINTIFFS FACE CONTINUED DIFFICULTIES
IN PROVING CAUSATION
As during the last Survey period, Texas courts continued to impose a
heavy burden upon malpractice plaintiffs to demonstrate causation. For
example, the San Antonio Court of Appeals reversed a $65.5 million
judgment against Baker Botts, LLP and Wells Fargo in Baker Botts,
L.L.P. v. Cailloux.1 Baker Botts provided estate planning services for
Kathleen Cailloux and her husband Floyd. After Floyd's death, Wells
Fargo became the independent executor of Floyd's share of the marital
estate. Baker Botts continued to represent Kathleen after her husband's
death. In addition, Baker Botts represented Wells Fargo in connection
with the administration of Floyd's estate as well as one of the foundations
that was created as part of the Caillouxes' estate planning process. Baker
Botts sought and obtained conflict waivers from Kathleen, Wells Fargo,
and the foundation. After Floyd's death, Baker Botts began working
with Kathleen to revise the estate plan. As part of that revised plan,
Kathleen voluntarily disclaimed her right to her husband's share of the
marital estate, and $65.5 million was accordingly transferred to various
charitable organizations identified by Floyd in his will, rather than going
into a trust for Kathleen's benefit.2 After Kathleen was diagnosed with
Alzheimer's disease, her son Ken obtained a power of attorney and began
to manage her affairs. Upon review of Baker Botts' files, he concluded
that Baker Botts and Wells Fargo had engaged in "conspiracy and fraud"
1. See 224 S.W.3d 723 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2007, pet. denied).
2. Id. at 726, 732.
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in convincing Kathleen to disclaim her interest in Floyd's estate, and he
brought suit. At trial, the jury concluded that Baker Botts and Wells
Fargo had breached their fiduciary duties to Kathleen by failing to "fully
and fairly disclose all important information to Kathleen."'3 The jury
found that Kathleen could have received $65.5 million in trust if not for
the breaches of duty, but that her actual lost income and other economic
losses were $0. 4 In light of the jury's findings, the trial court, using its
"equitable powers," ordered Baker Botts and Wells Fargo to create an
equitable trust for Kathleen's benefit of $65.5 million. 5
The court of appeals reversed, holding there was no evidence that the
conduct complained of caused Kathleen to disclaim her right to Floyd's
estate.6 The court noted that none of the trial witnesses had any knowl-
edge of Kathleen's true wishes or intentions and, therefore, any assump-
tion about what Kathleen would have done had she been fully informed
of all material information was speculative and based on conjecture. 7
The court stated that "any attempt to infer or assume what Kathleen
would have done in this case had she been adequately advised is
improper."8
Alternatively, the court held that even if the plaintiff had provided
proof of causation, the trial court nevertheless "abused its discretion by
imposing an 'equitable trust' upon Baker Botts and Wells Fargo."9 The
court noted that a
constructive trust is a relationship with respect to property, subject-
ing the person by whom the title to the property is held to an equita-
ble duty to convey it to another, on the ground that his acquisition or
retention of the property is wrongful and that he would be unjustly
enriched if he were permitted to retain the property. 10
Because Baker Botts and Wells Fargo did not hold title to the trust princi-
pal, the trial court could not impose a constructive trust.1 1 In addition,
the court held that the trial court abused its discretion because the crea-
tion of the trust "essentially place[d] Kathleen in a better position than
she previously occupied" because it allowed her to enjoy the benefits of
disclaimer (making a substantial charitable gift during her lifetime, reduc-
ing the likelihood of an IRS audit of her estate, and virtually eliminating
her estate's tax liability upon her death) while also enjoying the benefits
of the Baker Botts/Wells Fargo trust.t2
3. Id. at 732.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 726.
6. Id. at 734.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 736.
10. Id.
11. See id.
12. Id. at 737-38.
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The San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment in an-
other legal malpractice case on the grounds that the plaintiff failed to
raise an issue of fact regarding causation. Collins v. Snow1 3 arose from
Mr. Snow's alleged negligent representation of Mr. Collins in a medical
malpractice action. The plaintiff alleged that the lawyer failed to ade-
quately plead, prove, and submit a claim for lack of informed consent for
a medical procedure that resulted in his wife's death. 14 The court of ap-
peals affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in the medical
malpractice action, finding that the plaintiff failed to establish an issue of
fact as to one of the elements of the medical malpractice claim-that the
patient would have refused the treatment had she been informed of the
undisclosed risks. 15 Because the plaintiff could not adequately establish
the merits of his underlying claim, he could not prove causation in the
malpractice case. 1
6
In McLendon v. Detoto,17 the Fourteenth District Houston Court of
Appeals followed the rule established in Peeler v. Hughes & Luce,18 that
malpractice plaintiffs who have been convicted of a crime cannot estab-
lish proximate causation with regard to any alleged legal malpractice in
their criminal trial unless they have been exonerated of the crime on di-
rect appeal, through post-conviction relief, or otherwise. Because Mc-
Lendon presented no evidence that he had been exonerated, the court of
appeals granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant lawyer. 19
B. PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER OUT-OF-STATE LAWYERS
Another issue faced by the Texas courts during this Survey period is
whether and when to allow non-Texas attorneys to be sued in Texas by
Texas citizens. The Austin Court of Appeals refused to find personal ju-
risdiction over two out-of-state attorneys in Red v. Doherty,2 0 where two
California attorneys were sued in Texas state court after their client, a
defendant in a wrongful death action in California, moved to Texas and
filed bankruptcy. In the Texas bankruptcy proceeding (in which the client
was represented by Texas counsel), the bankruptcy court ruled that the
wrongful death claims qualified as exceptions to discharge under 11
U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (2000) because the collision was the result of the de-
fendant's willful and malicious conduct. The California state court then
ruled that such decision was res judicata as to the wrongful death claims
against the defendant in California. The Austin Court of Appeals af-
13. No. 04-05-00903-CV, 2006 WL 2955478, at *1 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Oct. 18,
2006, no pet.) (mem. op.).
14. See id.
15. See id. at *2.
16. See id.
17. See No. 14-06-00658-CV, 2007 WL 1892312, at *1 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
18. 909 S.W.2d 494, 497-98 (Tex. 1995).
19. McLendon, 2007 WL 1892312, at *1-2.
20. See No. 03-06-00478-CV, 2007 WL 2066182, at *1 (Tex. App.-Austin July 20,
2007, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
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firmed the trial court's ruling that the California lawyers could not be
sued for malpractice in Texas.21 The court reasoned that the California
lawyers were hired to represent the defendant before he moved to Texas
and that they did not have contact with the defendant or his counsel in
Texas except as necessary to coordinate the defense in the California liti-
gation; therefore, the California counsel did not purposefully avail them-
selves of the privileges and benefits of conducting business in Texas.22
The Fourteenth District Houston Court of Appeals also issued two
opinions this year on personal jurisdiction over out-of-state attorneys,
and in both cases found a lack of minimum contacts to support jurisdic-
tion.23 In Markette v. X-Ray X-Press Corp.,24 the court held that a non-
resident attorney was not subject to jurisdiction in Texas where the attor-
ney represented a client in an Indiana lawsuit but arguably provided ad-
vice regarding Texas law. In a letter to the client, the Indiana attorney
advised the client of three options, one of which was to allow a defaultjudgment to be taken in the Indiana lawsuit and then "use the Texas court
system" to attack personal jurisdiction. 25 The client followed that advice,
and ultimately was required to satisfy the default judgment. 26 In the legal
malpractice case that followed, the court of appeals held that the lawyer's
act of giving legal advice on Texas law directed to a Texas client was in-
sufficient to sustain personal jurisdiction over the attorney in Texas. 27 In
Weldon-Francke v. Fisher,28 the Fourteen District Houston Court of Ap-
peals held that merely maintaining a firm website that is accessible to
Texas residents is also insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over a
non-resident law firm. The court noted that Internet contacts are evalu-
ated on a "sliding scale":
At one end of the continuum, the website may support a finding of
personal jurisdiction when a defendant does business over the in-
ternet by entering into contracts and through the repeated transmis-
sion of computer files. At the other end of the continuum, personaljurisdiction cannot be based on the passive posting of information on
the internet. 29
Because the website at issue was passive and informational and did not
allow for the exchange of information between the user and the law firm
or the transaction of business or entry into contracts through the website,
the court of appeals found out that the law firm was not subject to per-
21. Id. at *6.
22. Id.
23. See Markette v. X-Ray X-Press Corp., 240 S.W.3d 464 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 2007, no pet.); Weldon-Francke v. Fisher, 237 S.W.3d 789 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 2007, no pet.).
24. Markette, 240 S.W.3d at 464.
25. Id. at 466.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 468-69.
28. See Weldon-Francke, 237 S.W.3d at 789 (internal citations omitted).
29. Id. at 799.
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sonal jurisdiction in Texas. 30
Although not a Texas case, Sample v. Morgan3' should serve as a cau-
tionary tale to Texas and out-of-state practitioners alike. In that case, a
corporate shareholder brought a derivative action in Delaware against,
among others, the lawyer and law firm who were acting as the corpora-
tion's outside counsel. 32 The lawyer and law firm moved to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction. 33 The court denied defendants' motion,
holding that in 1) preparing and delivering to Delaware for filing a certifi-
cate amendment under challenge in the lawsuit; 2) advertising themselves
as being able to provide coast-to-coast legal services and as experts in
matters of corporate governance; 3) providing legal advice on a range of
Delaware law matters at issue in the lawsuit; and 4) undertaking to direct
the defense of the Delaware lawsuit, the defendants had subjected them-
selves to personal jurisdiction in Delaware. The court noted:
The United States Supreme Court has held that it is constitutionally
permissible to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident de-
fendant when that defendant should have "reasonably anticipated
... that his . . . actions might result in the forum state exercising
personal jurisdiction over him in order to adjudicate disputes arising
from those actions." To satisfy this test, the defendant need not
have ever entered the forum state physically because the Supreme
Court has rightly focused the test on the more relevant question of
whether the defendant has engaged in such conduct directed toward
the forum state that makes it reasonably foreseeable that that con-
duct could give rise to claims against the defendant in the forum
state's courts.3
4
The court found that for "sophisticated counsel to argue that they did not
realize that acting as the de facto outside general counsel to a Delaware
corporation and regularly providing advice about Delaware law about
matters important to that corporation and its stockholders might expose
it to this court's jurisdiction fails the straight-face test."'35 The opinion
reflects a good amount of frustration by the Delaware court towards
these particular lawyer-defendants, and the court stated that it was a
"highly unusual case" that should not cause law firms providing advice to
Delaware corporations to fear that they will be regularly hauled into
court there. 36 But the court's broad statements of law and policy will
inevitably cause some concern.
30. Id. at 799-800.
31. 935 A.2d 1046 (Del. Ch. 2007).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1062-63 (quoting In re USACafes, L.P. Litig., 600 A.2d 43, 50 (Del. Ch.
1991)).




C. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN LEGAL MALPRACTICE CASES
During this Survey period, Texas courts considered two cases interpret-
ing the Hughes Tolling Rule, which tolls the statute of limitations "when
an attorney commits malpractice in the prosecution or defense of a claim
that results in litigation ... until all appeals on the underlying claim are
exhausted or the litigation is otherwise finally concluded. '37 In Estate of
Whitsett v. Junell,38 the First District Houston Court of Appeals held that
the phrase "claim that results in litigation" should be construed broadly
to include all claims for an indivisible injury that an attorney is hired to
pursue on behalf of a client as well as any claim the attorney must assert
on behalf of the client in the exercise of reasonable care. Therefore,
when an attorney represents a client on multiple claims arising out of the
same occurrence or subject matter but negligently fails to file one or
more of those claims entirely, the Hughes rule tolls the statute of limita-
tions for a legal malpractice claim against the attorney until all appeals
for the filed claims are exhausted. 39
The Amarillo Court of Appeals also considered the Hughes Tolling
Rule in Brennan v. Manning,40 a legal malpractice case arising out of an
attorney's representation in a divorce proceeding. The client argued that
tolling should be extended for some period after her divorce decree be-
came final since her attorney also performed subsequent legal services to
enforce the decree. 4 1 The court disagreed, holding that the policy con-
cerns underlying the Hughes Tolling Rule did not support an extension of
that rule beyond the date that litigation concluded. 42 The court also held
that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate sufficient facts to trigger the dis-
covery rule or the fraudulent concealment doctrine to further extend the
statute of limitations. 43
D. DETERMINING DAMAGES ALLEGEDLY RESULTING
FROM LITIGATION MALPRACTICE
The Dallas Court of Appeals considered several issues related to litiga-
tion malpractice damages in Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, L.L.P.
v. National Development & Research Corp.44 The client, National Devel-
opment & Research Corp. ("NDR"), brought claims against Akin,
Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, L.L.P. ("Akin Gump") alleging that the
law firm negligently failed to submit jury questions to support a partial
37. Hughes v. Mahaney & Higgins, 821 S.W.2d 154, 157 (Tex. 1991); see also Apex
Towing Co. v. Tolin, 41 S.W.3d 118, 119-20 (Tex. 2001).
38. 218 S.W.3d 765, 771-72 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (citing
Sanchez v. Hastings, 898 S.W.2d 287, 288 (Tex. 1995)).
39. Id.
40. No. 07-06-0041-CV, 2007 WL 1098476, at *1 (Tex. App.-Amarillo Apr. 12, 2007,
pet. denied) (mem. op.).
41. Id.
42. See id. at *2.
43. Id. at *3.
44. See 232 S.W.3d 883 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, pet. filed).
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verdict in the client's favor. 45 This alleged negligence resulted in the en-
try of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict ("JNOV") against the cli-
ent.46 In the malpractice case, the jury found the law firm negligent and
assessed $922,631.86 in damages. Akin Gump appealed, seeking to re-
duce the damages awarded.47
First, the law firm alleged that NDR did not prove its alleged damages
would have been collectible from the defendant in the underlying suit.48
The court agreed that, in order to prove the law firm's alleged negligence
actually caused damages, NDR was required to prove that a damage
award in the underlying suit would have been collectible and that NDR
was, therefore, required to provide evidence that the defendants in that
suit were "solvent 'on the date the case was filed or anytime thereaf-
ter." 49 But the court of appeals held that NDR had produced sufficient
evidence of collectibility.50 The law firm also argued that the trial court
erred in awarding NDR $216,590 for attorneys' fees incurred by NDR in
the underlying lawsuit.51 NDR argued that it was not seeking to recover
the attorneys' fees it expended at trial, rather, the appellate "fees it in-
curred to appeal its loss at trial, only to lose again."52 The court of ap-
peals acknowledged the debate among Texas appellate courts and
commentators concerning whether attorneys' fees and expenses incurred
in prior litigation may be included as a measure of damages in a subse-
quent legal malpractice case, but it relied on the "binding authority" of its
own previous decisions and held that NDR's attorneys' fees were not re-
coverable against Akin Gump.53
The court of appeals also considered a damages issue of first impres-
sion in Texas: whether damages in a malpractice suit should be reduced
by the contingency fee the client would have owed had it prevailed in the
underlying litigation. 54 Akin Gump argued that, had NDR prevailed in
the underlying trial, it would have owed Akin Gump a ten percent contin-
gency fee and, therefore, the verdict should be reduced by that amount in
order to place NDR in the same position it would have occupied absent
the alleged negligence. 55 The appellate court considered the divergent
opinions on this issue by courts in other jurisdictions and held that Akin
Gump was not entitled to the requested offset.56 It concluded that the
law firm would have been entitled to its contingency fee only if NDR
prevailed in the underlying lawsuit, which it did not, and that to allow the
45. Id. at 888.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 889.
49. Id. at 895.
50. Id. at 895.
51. Id. at 995-96.
52. Id. at 896.
53. Id. at 896-97 (listing cases).
54. Id. at 897.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 897-98 (listing cases).
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firm an offset for the contingency fee would in effect reward the firm for
its wrongdoing.57 Akin Gump has filed a petition for review with the
Texas Supreme Court.
E. STANDARD FOR ESTABLISHING BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
During this Survey period, Texas courts continued to reject claims for
breach of fiduciary duty when those claims were based on allegations that
the lawyers failed to meet the standard of care. 58 Such claims are an im-
permissible attempt to fracture a plaintiff's claim for legal malpractice. 59
In Capital City Church of Christ v. Novak, however, the Austin Court
of Appeals considered a stand-alone claim for breach of fiduciary duty
brought by the lawyers' and law firm's former client. 60 The law firm de-
fendants had jointly represented two co-owners of a six-story building. 61
Several years later, the defendants represented one of the co-owners,
Chen, in litigation against the other, the Capital City Church of Christ
(the "Church"). The Church sued the lawyers for breach of fiduciary
duty, claiming that they misused confidential information obtained
through their prior representation of the Church in order to further their
representation of Chen. The trial court granted summary judgment in
favor of the lawyer defendants, and the Church appealed. 62 On appeal,
the Austin Court of Appeals considered whether the Church had pro-
vided evidence of specific confidential information allegedly used or di-
vulged to Chen.63 The Church argued that such evidence was
unnecessary, relying on the standards used in a disqualification setting.
In that context, a former client may disqualify its former attorney from
later representing the client's adversary against it if it can demonstrate
a "substantial relationship" between the two representations by
proving "the existence of a prior attorney-client relationship in which
the factual matters involved were so related to the facts in the pend-
ing litigation that it creates a genuine threat that confidences re-
vealed to his former counsel will be divulged to his present
adversary. 64
If the former client meets this burden, it is presumed that there are confi-
57. Id. at 899.
58. See, e.g., Stromberger v. Law Offices of Windle Turley, P.C., No. 05-06-00841-CV,
2007 WL 2994643, at *4 (Tex. App.-Dallas Oct. 16, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.) (affirming
summary judgment on fiduciary duty and fraud claims on the grounds that such claims
"reiterated the facts forming the basis of Stromberger's cause of action for negligence");
O'Donnell v. Smith, 234 S.W.3d 135, 146 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2007, pet. granted)(finding that alleging that a "firm failed to 'exercise the highest degree of care, good faith,
and honest dealing"' did not state claim for breach of fiduciary duty).
59. Stromberger, 2007 WL 2994643, at *4.
60. See No. 03-04-00750-CV, 2007 WL 1501095, at *1 (Tex. App.-Austin May 23,
2007, no pet.) (mem. op.).
61. Id. at *1.
62. Id.
63. Id. at *3.




dences and secrets at risk of disclosure.65 The court of appeals held, how-
ever, that such a presumption does not arise in a claim for breach of
fiduciary duty and cannot substitute for actual evidence of a breach.66
The court noted:
Establishing a "substantial relationship" between the prior and sub-
sequent representation for disqualification purposes does not give
rise to a presumption that confidences obtained in the prior repre-
sentation have actually been disclosed to the present adversary. To
the contrary, "the former attorney will not be presumed to have re-
vealed the confidences to his present client." A "substantial rela-
tionship" instead gives rise to an "appearance of impropriety"-a
basis for disqualification, not an element of a tort claim-that de-
rives from the perceived risk that confidential information will be
disclosed. 67
Accordingly, because, standing alone, a "substantial relationship" be-
tween prior and subsequent representations cannot raise a fact issue re-
garding an actual disclosure of confidences, the trial court properly
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. 68
F. THE PRIVITY BARRIER: WHO CAN SUE?
Texas courts continued to flesh out the contours of the privity require-
ment during this Survey period. As we reported in the last Survey, the
Texas Supreme Court ruled in 2006 that personal representatives of a de-
ceased client's estate have standing to bring legal malpractice claims on
behalf of the estate, reversing two court of appeals opinions that had held
to the contrary.69 The San Antonio Court of Appeals reconsidered one
of those cases, O'Donnell v. Smith,70 during the current Survey period.
In that case, Thomas O'Donnell, as executor of the estate of Corwin D.
Denney, appealed from a summary judgment in favor of the law firm and
attorneys who provided legal advice to Denney during his lifetime in his
capacity as executor of his wife's estate. The appeals court affirmed sum-
mary judgment, but that decision was vacated and remanded for recon-
sideration in light of Belt.71 On reconsideration, the defendant attorneys
argued that, even in light of Belt, the trial court correctly granted sum-
mary judgment because Belt only "narrowly relaxed the privity barrier to
65. Id.
66. Id. at *3-4 (discussing City of Garland v. Booth, 895 S.W.2d 766, 773 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1995, writ denied) and Reppert v. Hooks, No. 07-97-0302-CV, 1998 WL 548784, at
*28-29 (Tex. App.-Amarillo Aug. 28, 1998, pet. denied)).
67. Id. at *4 (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted).
68. Id.
69. Belt v. Oppenheimer, Blend, Harrison & Tate, Inc., 192 S.W.3d 780, 782 (Tex.
2006); O'Donnell v. Smith, 197 S.W.3d 394, 394 (Tex. 2006) (vacating court of appeals'
judgment and remanding for reconsideration in light of the Texas Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Belt).
70. O'Donnell v. Smith, 234 S.W.3d 135, 138 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2007, pet.
granted).




allow suits by personal representatives for estate-planning malpractice. 72
The attorneys maintained that, because the claims against them arose out
of advice to Denney with regard to his wife's estate and not his own, it
was not an "estate-planning" malpractice case and was not, therefore,
governed by Belt.73 The court of appeals disagreed in concluding that the
legal malpractice claims in Belt survived the death of the client, the su-
preme court relied on general legal principles and did not limit its holding
to the estate-planning context.7"
The Dallas Court of Appeals addressed claims by a non-client in Kast-
ner v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, P.C.75 In that case, Jenkens & Gilchrist
("Jenkens") and one of its attorneys were sued for negligent misrepresen-
tation by non-clients after a business venture in which the non-clients had
invested failed. The plaintiffs appealed from the trial court's grant of
summary judgment on all claims against the lawyer and law firm. Jenkens
had represented Randy Box, a real estate broker, in connection with the
formation of a single-asset Texas limited partnership to purchase an
apartment complex. 76 Using information provided by Box, Jenkens pre-
pared a partnership agreement, which it mailed to each of the limited
partners, including plaintiffs. Sometime later, the business began exper-
iencing financial difficulties, the limited partnership filed bankruptcy, and
the relationship between the general partner and the limited partners de-
teriorated. Plaintiffs sued Box and related entities, as well as Jenkens and
a Jenkens attorney, alleging among other things that the lawyer had made
negligent misrepresentations in the partnership agreement that he mailed
out to the limited partners. Plaintiffs asserted that their negligent misrep-
resentation claims fell within the narrow exception to the privity require-
ment recognized by the Texas Supreme Court in McCamish, Martin,
Brown & Loeffler v. F.E. Appling Interests.77 In McCamish, the Court
recognized that a non-client can assert a viable negligent misrepresenta-
tion claim against a professional and that such potential liability "results
from the 'professional's manifest awareness of the non-client's reliance
on the misrepresentation and the professional's intention that the non-
client so rely." 7 8 Accordingly, this cause of action may, in certain cir-
cumstances, "'permit[ ] plaintiffs who are not parties to a contract for
professional services to recover from the contracting professionals.'
79
The court of appeals held that this privity exception did not apply in Kast-
ner, where the only communication between the attorney and the plain-
tiffs was the neutral cover letter accompanying the partnership
72. Id. at 141 (emphasis added).
73. Id. at 142 n.9.
74. Id. at 142.
75. 231 S.W.3d 571 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.).
76. Id. at 574.
77. See id. (applying the exceptions recognized in McCamish, Martin, Brown & Loef-
fler v. F.E. Applying Interests, 991 S.W.2d 787, 791 (Tex. 1991)).




agreement.80 The court found that "[t]he cover letter contained no legal
opinions or evaluations; it conveyed neutral information about the
mechanics of the revisions he anticipated after the closing." 81 The court
rejected any idea that "the mere transmission of a partnership agreement
from an attorney to a non-client [could] reasonably be construed as a
legal opinion on the validity of the agreement or the propriety of invest-
ment in the partnership. '8 2 The court also held that the Kastners' at-
tempt to characterize the contents of the agreement as representations by
the lawyer simply because the lawyer conveyed the partnership agree-
ment via cover letter far exceeded the scope of liability allowed under
McCamish.8 3
II. ACCOUNTING MALPRACTICE
A. THE PRIVITY BARRIER IN ACCOUNTING MALPRACTICE
In Ervin v. Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp CPAS, L.L.P. ("MFSL"), 84
the San Antonio Court of Appeals relied on McCamish in one of the very
few summary judgment reversals in this area during the Survey period.
In that case, the plaintiffs brought claims against the defendant account-
ing firm for professional negligence and negligent misrepresentation aris-
ing out of the firm's alleged failure to discover an undisclosed $5 million
liability with the "buy out" of South Texas Wholesale Records and Tapes,
Inc. ("South Texas"). After the trial court granted summary judgment on
behalf of the defendant, the plaintiffs appealed. MFSL argued that the
plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue a negligent misrepresentation claim
because it was unaware of the plaintiffs and therefore could not have
intended to provide any information for their reliance. (See discussion of
McCamish above). The appellate court disagreed and sided with the
plaintiffs, holding that there was some evidence to suggest they were part
of a limited group of persons for whose benefit the information was sup-
plied or that MFSL knew the initial recipient intended to supply the in-
formation to the plaintiffs.8 5 The court looked at evidence suggesting
that MFSL knew its work was going to be used in connection with the
South Texas buy out and that it knew plaintiffs were included in the iden-
tified "Buyer Group" for that transaction. 86 The court held that, at a
minimum, MFSL knew it was providing information to some members of
the Buyer Group who could reasonably be expected to pass the informa-
tion on to other members of the Buyer Group, including plaintiffs. 87 In-
terestingly, the court held that "[t]he actions of MFSL in providing
multiple copies of [its] report may be construed as some evidence it in-
80. Id. at 578.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 578.
83. Id.
84. 234 S.W.3d 172, 177 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2007, no pet.).
85. Id. at 177.
86. Id. at 179-80.
87. Id. at 180.
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tended its work to be shared with the Buyer Group. ' 88 The court re-
jected MFSL's argument that, for plaintiffs to have standing to sue,
MFSL had to know the specific details of the transaction for which the
plaintiffs intended to use the information, noting that "[s]ection 552(2)(b)
[of the Restatement (Second) of Torts] requires simply that the person or
entity providing the information have knowledge about the transaction,
or a substantially similar transaction, for which the information is being
used."'8 9 Therefore, the court of appeals reversed the trial court's sum-
mary judgment on the negligent misrepresentation claim.90
The court also rejected MFSL's claim that it was entitled to summary
judgment on the plaintiffs' claim for professional negligence because it
held the evidence raised a material fact issue regarding the existence of
an accountant-client relationship between MFSL and the plaintiffs. 91 The
court acknowledged that a professional negligence claim requires privity
of contract and that MFSL had established the absence of any express
contractual relationship, but it found that plaintiffs had presented some
evidence to suggest an implied agreement to provide accounting services
to the entire Buyer Group, including the plaintiffs. 92 In so finding, the
court focused on some ambiguous language in the engagement agreement
suggesting that the engagement may have included parties other than
South Texas. The court also relied on evidence that MFSL sought permis-
sion from a member of the Buyer Group before providing information to
the President of South Texas, which South Texas were truly the only cli-
ent.9 3 Accordingly, the court of appeals reversed summary judgment on
the professional liability claim and remanded the case for trial.
94
B. PROVING CAUSATION IN AN ACCOUNTING MALPRACTICE CASE
In Blitz Holdings Corp. v. Grant Thornton, L.L.P.,95 the First District
Houston Court of Appeals considered the difficulties of proving causa-
tion in an accounting malpractice action. The plaintiffs appealed from a
directed verdict rendered in favor of the defendants, Grant Thornton and
Deloitte & Touche. The case against the two accounting firms arose out
of audit reports prepared by Grant Thornton and business valuations pre-
pared by Deloitte related to IFS Financial Holdings Corporation ("IFS")
and Interamericas Financial Holdings Corporation ("Interamericas"),
which were both indebted to plaintiff GCM. Plaintiff GCM alleged that
it relied on erroneous information prepared by the accounting firms in
deciding to restructure the debt of IFS and Interamericas rather than to
88. Id. at 178.
89. Id. at 180.
90. Id. at 185.
91. Id. at 182.
92. Id. at 183.
93. Id. at 184-85.
94. Id. at 185.
95. No. 01-04-00627-CV, 2007 WL 1971374, at *1 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] May
8, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.). The court withdrew earlier opinions dated May 24, 2007 and
Oct. 25, 2007, and issued this opinion upon rehearing.
10592008]
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foreclose. 96 GCM further alleged that, had it foreclosed on the debt in-
stead of agreeing to a restructure, it would have been able to recover at
least some of the debt. In reviewing the trial court's grant of directed
verdict, the court of appeals considered whether the plaintiffs provided
any evidence that, if GCM had foreclosed instead of restructuring the
debt in either October 1999 or March 2000, the foreclosure proceedings
would have, in reasonable probability, been successful in recovering any
of IFS's assets while they were still available, and it found that GCM had
produced no such evidence. 97 When plaintiffs attempted to foreclose on
the debt in June 2000, IFS transferred its assets to other entities in viola-
tion of a court order and then declared bankruptcy, making the debt un-
collectible. GCM failed to produce any evidence that it could have
achieved a better result had it initiated the foreclosure in either March
2000 or October 1999.98 Because there was no evidence that an earlier
foreclosure would have been any more successful than the attempted re-
structuring in recovering the IFS debt, directed verdict was appropriate. 99
In its motion for rehearing, GCM argued that the court failed to con-
sider Grant Thornton's audits and Deloitte's valuations as "some evi-
dence" of GCM's ability to recover damages from IFS. 100 The court
rejected that argument, however, holding that GCM could not rely on the
subject audits and valuations because it alleged in the lawsuit that such
audits and valuations were "inflated and unreliable.' ' 101 The court noted:
These allegations of Grant's and Deloitte's wrongful acts were not
made in the alternative. Further, the inaccuracy of the audits and
valuations forms the basis of GCM's theory of liability. If they are
not inaccurate, GCM could not have been harmed by relying on
them-as it alleges in its petition. 0 2
Because GCM's case relied on its allegations regarding the unreliability
of the audits and valuations, it could not rely on those same audits and
valuations to establish damages.
III. ARCHITECTURAL AND ENGINEERING MALPRACTICE
A. THE CERTIFICATE OF MERIT REQUIREMENT
During the Survey period, the San Antonio Court of Appeals consid-
ered for the first time the effect of recent amendments to section
150.002's requirement of a "certificate of merit" for claims against certain
licensed or registered professionals, including architects, surveyors, and
engineers. Section 150.002 requires a plaintiff to file an expert affidavit,
96. Plaintiff Blitz sought no independent relief, but sued as a necessary party. Id. at *1
n.1.
97. Id. at *12.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at *9.
101. Id. at *9-10.
102. Id. at *10.
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referred to as a "certificate of merit," to maintain a claim for damages
arising from the provision of professional services. 10 3 The statute was
amended in 2005 to apply to any action "arising out of the provision of
professional services" rather than to actions "alleging professional negli-
gence," and since then Texas courts have not considered the effect of that
amendment. 10 4 In Kniestedt v. Southwest Sound and Electronics, Inc.,
105
the defendant moved to dismiss the claims against it for tortious interfer-
ence with contract on the ground that the plaintiffs failed to file the re-
quired certificate of merit. The trial court denied the motion, and the
appellate court affirmed, holding that where the plaintiff alleges an inten-
tional tort rather than an act of negligence, a certificate of merit is not
required. 10 6 The San Antonio Court of Appeals reached the same result
in a similar case, Gomez v. STFG, Inc.,10 7 and further held that the dis-
missal of a negligence claim under section 150.002 does not require the
dismissal of related non-negligence claims, such as tortious interference,
conspiracy, breach of contract, wrongful termination, and breach of fidu-
ciary duty.1 0 8
IV. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
A. TOLLING OF LIMITATIONS IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES
During this Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court considered the
two-year limitations period found in chapter 74 of the Texas Civil Practice
and Remedies Code and its predecessor, the Medical Liability and Insur-
ance Improvement Act ("MLIIA"), 10 9 and suggested that the limitations
period may be unconstitutional as applied to some mentally-incapacitated
individuals.' 10 In Yancy v. United Surgical Partners International, Inc., the
mother of a patient who never regained consciousness after surgery ar-
gued that the limitations period for filing an action against her daughter's
nurse and surgical center should be tolled due to her daughter's vegeta-
tive state.' The mother claimed that section 10.01 of the MLIIA, which
prohibits tolling based on incapacity, violates the Texas Constitution's
guarantee that "[a]ll courts shall be open, and every person for an injury
done him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by
103. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 150.002 (Vernon Supp. 2008).
104. Id.
105. No. 04-07-00190-CV, 2007 WL 1892220 (Tex. App.-San Antonio July 3, 2007, no
pet.).
106. Id. at *2.
107. No. 04-07-00223-CV, 2007 WL 2846419 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Oct. 3, 2007, no
pet.).
108. Id. at *3.
109. Act of May 28, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 242, § 1, 1999 Tex. Gen. Laws 1104, re-
pealed by Act of Sept. 1, 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 204, § 10.09, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 884 [herein-
after "MLIIA"].




due course of law." 112
The supreme court held in Yancy that the statute of limitations was
constitutional as applied to the plaintiff in that case. 113 The supreme
court noted that the plaintiff had been appointed a guardian, obtained a
lawyer, and filed an original petition against other defendants within the
two-year limitations period, and that her mother "chose, for unknown
reasons, to sue some defendants but not others does not raise due process
concerns." 114 It concluded that "[b]ecause [the statute of limitations] is
constitutional as applied to [the plaintiff], there is no need to strike it
down because it might operate unconstitutionally in another case." 115
Although it declined to rule definitively on the issue, the supreme court
suggested that section 10.01 of the MLIIA could be unconstitutional as
applied in some circumstances.1'16 The supreme court remarked that the
plaintiff's "argument is precise: this court has already held that section
10.01 violates the open courts guarantee as applied to minors, and there is
no rational basis for allowing a plaintiff's minority but not her mental
incapacity to toll limitations for a health care liability claim. ' 117
B. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF PATIENTS IN
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTIONS
In Jackson v. Axelrad,118 the Texas Supreme Court held that patients
have a duty to cooperate with their physicians, and that their failure to do
so can constitute contributory negligence. The patient in Jackson was a
psychiatrist who suffered a perforated colon after his internist misdiag-
nosed his diverticulitis. At trial, the internist explained that he had not
suspected the true nature of the psychiatrist's illness because the psychia-
trist had never reported pain consistent with that malady. The psychia-
trist, in disputing this contention, designated himself as an expert at trial,
presented himself as familiar with his type of complaint, and described his
pain as a "classic sign of diverticulitis." 119 The jury found that both the
patient and internist had been negligent. Because it assigned 51% of
fault to the patient, and only 49% to the internist, the trial court entered
a take-nothing judgment.1 20 An appellate court reversed and remanded,
holding that the plaintiff's negligence should be disregarded because pa-
tients usually have no duty to volunteer information to their doctors.12'
112. Id. at 783-84 (quoting Tex. Const. art. I § 13). Although the MLIIA was repealed
in 2003, § 74.251(a) includes a two-year statute of limitations with the same wording as that
of the MLIIA, subject to an exception for minors under the age of twelve. See TEX. Civ.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.251 (Vernon 2005).
113. Yancy, 236 S.W.3d at 786.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 654-55.
117. Id. at 784 (internal citation omitted).
118. 221 S.W.3d 650 (Tex. 2007).
119. Id. at 657.




The Texas Supreme Court disagreed, holding that patients have a duty
to cooperate in their treatment, which requires ordinary care under all
the surrounding circumstances. The supreme court described this duty as
varying depending on the unique situations and the individuals involved,
including "the language skills of [physician and patient], their specialized
knowledge, the length of the relationship, the urgency of the situation,
the frequency of previous examinations, the patient's current condition,
and so on."'1 22 Rather than assigning physician-patients a higher standard
of care, the supreme court stated that determining whether a patient ac-
ted with "ordinary prudence" includes consideration of that patient's ex-
pertise, quoting Prosser and Keeton that "[i]f a person in fact has
knowledge, skill, or even intelligence superior to that of the ordinary per-
son, the law will demand of that person conduct consistent with it.' 12 3
Because there was evidence from which the jury could have concluded
that the psychiatrist shared the blame for his injury, the supreme court
reversed the appellate court's judgment and remanded for a factual suffi-
ciency review.124
C. DEFICIENCY OF EXPERT REPORTS
Chapter 74's requirement that a medical malpractice petition be ac-
companied by an expert report was a major source of contention during
the Survey period. 125 Notably, several cases addressed when a report is
so deficient as to constitute "no report" under section 74.351.126 This dis-
tinction has become important because if an expert report is served
within 120 days but fails to meet the subsection's reporting requirements
a court has discretion to grant "one 30-day extension to the claimant in
order to cure the deficiency.' 27 However, the failure to serve a report
eliminates the possibility of a grace period and requires that a court "(1)
award[ ] to the affected physician or health care provider reasonable at-
torney's fees and costs of court incurred by the physician or health care
provider; and (2) dismiss[] the claim with respect to the physician or
health care provider, with prejudice to the refiling of the claim."'1 28
122. Id. at 655.
123. Id. at 656 (quoting W. Keeton et al., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 32 (5th
ed. 1984) (citations omitted)).
124. Id. at 658-59.
125. A search found more than forty-five Texas state cases addressing issues related to
the medical expert reporting requirement. Federal district courts have held that the expert
reporting rules do not apply in federal court because they are preempted by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. See Mason v. United States, 486 F. Supp. 2d 621, 623-26 (W.D.
Tex. 2007).
126. See, e.g., De La Vergne v. Turner, No. 04-06-00722-CV, 2007 WL 1608872 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio June 6, 2007, no pet.) (upholding the trial court's denial of a grace
period because the plaintiff's expert report had been written by a registered nurse rather
than a physician, and the plaintiff needed to file a new report to satisfy statutory require-
ments); Apodaca v. Russo, 228 S.W.3d 252, 258 (Tex. App.-Austin 2007, no pet.) (holding
that an expert report filed by a patient's estate did not represent a "good faith effort" to
comply with chapter 74 and, therefore, constituted "no report").




The San Antonio and Houston appellate courts have held that the ab-
sence of a physician's opinion on causation renders an expert report the
equivalent of "no report," requiring the court to dismiss the plaintiff's
suit.129 The courts have interpreted the statute as "vest[ing] the trial
court with the discretion to grant an extension, but only to cure deficien-
cies in the existing reports," not to file a new report with the required
opinion on causation. 130
In November 2007, the Texas Supreme Court addressed a similar issue.
In Ogletree v. Matthews, the supreme court considered both whether a
defendant may file an interlocutory appeal from a court's grant of a
thirty-day extension, and when a report is so deficient as to constitute "no
report.' 131 The plaintiffs in Ogletree brought claims against an urologist
and hospital based on the urologist's care of an eighty-four-year-old pa-
tient who died, allegedly due to a bladder perforation and kidney failure
caused by the urologist's negligent insertion of a catheter.132 The plain-
tiffs filed three expert reports, one from a radiologist, which dealt with
the urologist's standard of care, and the remainder from nurses, which
dealt primarily with the behavior of hospital nurses. 133 The urologist
timely objected to the reports, arguing they did not comply with statutory
requirements. The hospital, however, failed to object within twenty-one
days as mandated by chapter 74. To avoid dismissal of its objections, the
hospital argued that no objection to the nurses' reports was necessary
because the reports were so deficient as to be nonexistent due to the ab-
sence of a physician's opinion on causation. 34 The trial court found that
the radiologist's report was deficient, but granted a thirty-day extension
to remedy the deficiencies. The trial court rejected the "no report" argu-
ment, holding that the hospital had waived its objections.
Both the urologist and hospital appealed the decision. The appellate
court found that it was without jurisdiction to consider the urologist's ap-
peal because of chapter 74's prohibition against the interlocutory appeal
of orders granting an extension to cure reporting deficiencies. The appel-
late court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the hospital's objection. 35
The Texas Supreme Court agreed that it was without jurisdiction to con-
sider the urologist's arguments and it rejected the urologist's attempt to
sever the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss from its grant of the
thirty-day extension.' 36 It described "the actions denying the motion to
129. See Cuellar v. Warm Springs Rehab. Found., No. 04-06-00698-CV, 2007 WL
3355611, at *4 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Nov. 14, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.); De La Vergne,
2007 WL 1608872, at *1; Methodist Health Ctr. v. Thomas, No. 14-07-00085-CV, 2007 WL
2367619, at *4 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 1, 2007, no pet.).
130. Cuellar, 2007 WL 3355611, at *4; see also De La Vergne, 2007 WL 1608872, at *1;
Methodist Health Ctr., 2007 WL 2367619, at *4.
131. No. 06-0502, 2007 WL 4216606 (Tex. Nov. 30, 2007). Although outside the Survey
period, this case is important for a correct understanding of the current law in this area.
132. Id. at *1.
133. Id.
134. Id. at *2.
135. Id.
136. Id. at *3.
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dismiss and granting an extension" as inseperable and remarked that "[i]f
a defendant could immediately (and prematurely) appeal, the court of
appeals would address the report's sufficiency while its deficiencies were
presumably being cured at the trial court level, an illogical and wasteful
result. 1 137 Although the supreme court spent almost two pages discuss-
ing the urologist's arguments, it disposed of the hospital's contentions in
only two paragraphs. The supreme court noted that the reports clearly
implicated the hospital's conduct, and described the hospital's motion to
dismiss as being directed at the reports' "sufficiency." Because the hospi-
tal's arguments "could have been urged within the statutory twenty-one
day period, as the statute clearly requires," the supreme court held that
the hospital had waived its objections and that the trial court had cor-
rectly denied its motion. 1
38
D. THE SCOPE OF HEALTH CARE LIABILITY CLAIMS
UNDER THE MLIIA AND CHAPTER 74
Texas courts have generally taken a broad view of the definition of
"health care liability" claims under both chapter 74139 and the MLIIA.
1 40
While some courts have interpreted the language of chapter 74 as nar-
rower than that of the MLIIA, other courts have treated the two statutes
as indistinguishable.
In Valley Baptist Medical Center v. Stradley,141 the Corpus Christi
Court of Appeals found that the definition of "health care liability" did
not include negligence and premises liability claims brought by a patient
who fell on a medical center's treadmill.1 42 The court rejected the medi-
cal center's argument that the causes of action should be characterized as
"health care liability" claims based on the Texas Supreme Court's holding
in Diversicare General Partner, Inc. v. Rubio.143 The Corpus Christi
Court of Appeals described Diversicare as holding that "the legislature
meant to include all safety claims against health care providers or physi-
137. Id. at *4. A Tyler appellate court recently avoided this prohibition by dismissing
an interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction, and then conditionally granting the defen-
dant mandamus relief. Nexion Health at Oak Manor, Inc. v. Brewer, Nos. 12-06-00307-
CV, 12-06-00349-CV, 2008 WL 151287, at *4 (Tex. App.-Tyler Jan. 16, 2008, no pet.).
138. Ogletree, 2007 WL 42116606, at *5.
139. Section 74.001 of the chapter, which defines health care liability claims, applies to
claims filed after September 1, 2003. Clark v. TIRR Rehab. Ctr., 227 S.W.3d 256, 258 n.2
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist] 2007, no pet.).
140. See, e.g., Lee v. Boothe, 235 S.W.3d 448 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, pet. denied)
(applying the requirements of chapter 74 to an eye surgery patient's claims that his physi-
cian violated the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and committed fraud and assault);
Marks v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., 229 S.W.3d 396, 402 (Tex. App.-Houston f1st Dist]
2007, pet. granted) (applying MLIIA requirements to the negligence claims of a patient
who fell while getting out of bed because the claims were "relate[d] to departures from
accepted standards of medical care, health care, or safety").
141. 210 S.W.3d 770 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2006, pet. denied).
142. Id. at 775.




cians within the scope of the MLIIA.' 144 However, the court found that
chapter 74, unlike the MLIIA, included within the definition of "health
care liability" only those safety violations "directly related to health
care."' 145 The court found that the plaintiff's claims were not "directly
related to health care," despite the fact that her physician had recom-
mended she exercise regularly. 146 The court commented that "[w]hile ex-
ercise has a salutary effect on one's health, in most situations a doctor's
recommendation of regular exercise is no more related to the rendition of
health care than the automobile ride one makes for a doctor's
appointment."147
The First District Houston Court of Appeals agreed with Stradley's in-
terpretation of chapter 74 in Christus Health v. Beal.'48 The Christus
Health court held that a drug and alcohol treatment center resident who
was injured when his bed collapsed was not required to comply with
chapter 74's requirement that he file an expert report. 149 The court de-
termined that "a safety claim under Chapter 74 can be categorized as a
health care liability claim 'only when it is . . .for a claimed departure
from accepted standards of safety directly related to health care."1 50 It
concluded that a complaint about a faulty bed did not directly relate to
drug and alcohol rehabilitation and could not, therefore, be characterized
as a health care liability claim. 15'
Other courts have failed to note any difference between chapter 74 and
its predecessor. 152 For example, in Clark v. TIRR Rehabilitation Center,
the First District Houston Court of Appeals relied on the Texas Supreme
Court's construction of the repealed MLIIA in Diversicare to justify dis-
missing the negligence claims of a plaintiff who failed to comply with the
requirements of chapter 74.153 The plaintiff in Clark was a sixty-four-
year-old woman who died allegedly due to complications from injuries
she suffered after falling off of a "balance board" while undergoing physi-
cal therapy. The court concluded that the claim was one for health-care
liability because "an integral part of the services rendered by TIRR is the
supervision of patients during therapy-exercises" and because expert tes-
timony would be necessary to show the physical therapist's alleged
negligence. 154
144. Valley Baptist Med. Ctr., 210 S.W.3d at 773-74.
145. Id. at 774 (quoting TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.001(13) (Vernon
2005)) (emphasis in original).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 776.
148. 240 S.W.3d 282 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet. h.).
149. Id. at 290.
150. Id. at 289 (emphasis in original).
151. Id. at 290.
152. See, e.g., Sloan v. Farmer, 217 S.W.3d 763 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, pet. denied);
Clark v. TIRR Rehab. Ctr., 227 S.W.3d 256 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.).
153. Clark, 227 S.W.3d at 262-63.
154. Id. at 263-64.
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E. ORAL DEPOSITIONS DURING A CHAPTER 74 STAY
During the Survey period, several courts explored the limits of a provi-
sion of chapter 74 that stays discovery until the filing of an expert report.
Section 74.351(s) states that, until a report is filed, all discovery must
cease, with certain exceptions for written discovery, depositions on writ-
ten questions, and discovery from nonparties. 155 The statute leaves un-
resolved whether a plaintiff may take oral depositions in order to
investigate a possible claim, and this ambiguity has generated several ap-
pellate court opinions.
The Dallas and Fourteenth District Houston Courts of Appeals re-
cently rejected arguments that the restriction does not bar oral deposi-
tions of potential defendants who have not yet been named in a
lawsuit. 156 The courts described this contention as ignoring the legisla-
ture's purpose in enacting chapter 74 of reducing systemic costs due to
health care liability claims, which the legislature characterized as having
had "a material adverse effect on the delivery of medical and health care
in Texas."'157
However, the Texarkana Court of Appeals found an exception to the
general rule when a plaintiff has theories of recovery other than health
care liability claims. 158 In In re Temple, the court found that limited pre-
suit oral depositions are permissible when the plaintiff seeks to determine
what type of claim to file.159 The plaintiff in Temple alleged that the re-
placement implanted in his right knee was designed for a left knee joint.
He sought permission to take oral depositions to help him decide whether
to sue his physician or the manufacturer of the incorrect knee. The trial
court granted the request but limited the subject-matter of the
depositions. 160
The Texarkana court described the plaintiff as having "two divergent
theories of potential liability.' 161 Under the first theory, which involved
"a health care liability suit against doctors or possibly other health care
personnel," pre-suit depositions would be barred by chapter 74.162 Under
the second theory, which involved "a negligence or products liability
cause of action against the knee joint manufacturer or provider," pre-suit
depositions would be allowed. 163 To resolve this conflict, the court deter-
mined that the trial court should "limit the subject matter to exclude the
health care questions prohibited by Section 74.351, and allow questions as
155. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351(s) (Vernon Supp. 2008).
156. In re Clapp, 241 S.W.3d 913 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.); see also In re
Mem'l Hermann Hosp. Sys., 209 S.W.3d 835 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no
pet.).
157. Clapp, 241 S.W.3d at 918 n.5; Mem'l Hermann Hosp. Sys., 209 S.W.3d at 840.
158. In re Temple, 239 S.W.3d 885 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2007, no pet.).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 886.





to the source and handling of the device implanted in [the plaintiff.]' 1 64
Because the court found the trial court's order permitting the depositions
overly broad, it conditionally granted a petition for a writ of mandamus
to forestall them.a65 The court resolved to grant mandamus relief only if
the trial court failed to rescind or modify its order.1 66
V. DIRECTOR AND OFFICER LIABILITY
A. IDENTITY AND RELEASES UNDER THE TEXAS TAX CODE
Last year's Texas Survey included three cases addressing personal juris-
diction under section 171.255 of the Texas Tax Code. 167 During this Sur-
vey period, courts analyzed the substance of that statute, described by
some courts as a "Draconian" provision designed to encourage payment
of the corporate franchise tax.168
In Martin v. State, Martin, an officer of defunct corporation Pathfinder
Capital, L.C. ("Pathfinder"), challenged the admissibility and sufficiency
of evidence used to prove that, pursuant to section 171.255 of the Tax
Code, he was an officer or director of the corporation, and therefore sev-
erally liable for expenses and administrative fees incurred by the State of
Texas in cleaning up an abandoned salt water disposal facility previously
owned by the corporation. 169 Pathfinder failed to pay its franchise taxes
and forfeited its corporate privileges and charter on May 16, 2002. The
defendant Martin was listed as an officer of Pathfinder on the corpora-
tion's 1996 and 2002 "Transporter's Transportation Authority and Certifi-
cate of Compliance" (Form P-4) and the corporation's "Organizational
Report" (Form P-5). Martin signed both documents, and an affidavit by
the custodian of the Commission's records stated that the corporation
had never amended its filings. After the corporation forfeited its privi-
leges, the Commission spent over $151,000 in state funds to clean up its
salt water disposal site. The State filed suit against Pathfinder as the re-
sponsible company and against Martin individually. The district court
ruled in favor of the State against both Pathfinder and Martin, awarding
$151,641.83 in costs, fees, prejudgment interest, and attorney's fees. The
trial court found Martin jointly and severally liable under section




167. Kelli M. Hinson, Jennifer Evans Morris & Elizabeth A. Snyder, Professional Lia-
bility, 60 SMU L. REV. 1233, 1253-57 (2007).
168. Martin v. State, No. 03-05-00810-CV, 2007 WL 2214502, at *2 (Tex. App.-Austin,
Aug. 3, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Williams v. Adams, 74 S.W.3d 437, 440 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 2002, pet. denied)).
169. Section 171.255(a) provides that if the corporate privileges of the corporation are
forfeited due to the corporation's failure to file a report or pay tax or penalty, the directors
and officers of the corporation are individually liable for each debt of the corporation that
is created or incurred after the date on which the report, tax, or penalty is due but before




Martin argued that there was no evidence that he was an officer or
director when the corporation's debt was created or incurred because the
only evidence of him being an officer or director was Form P-4 and Form
P-5, which merely listed him as an officer or director at the time the forms
were filed. In viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
verdict, the Austin Court of Appeals found that the evidence at trial was
"both legally and factually sufficient to support the court's implicit find-
ing that Martin was a director or officer of Pathfinder when the cleanup
expenses were incurred and when the administrative penalties were as-
sessed.' 170 Significant to the court's ruling was section 3.1 of the Texas
Administrative Code, which requires corporations to provide the identi-
ties of officers in a Form P-5 and requires organizations to amend those
reports within fifteen days after a change in any information. The court
of appeals noted that section 3.1 creates a presumption that the officers
are unchanged until the Form P-5 is amended or all duties owed by the
corporation are fulfilled. Because Pathfinder's Form P-5 listed Martin as
the sole primary officer, was signed by Martin, and had never been
amended, the court of appeals found that "the unrebutted and dispositive
presumption [was] that Martin continued as an officer of Pathfinder at all
relevant times. ' 17 1 Consequently, the court of appeals affirmed the trial
court's ruling that Martin was jointly and severally liable for the expenses
and administrative fees incurred by the State of Texas.172
An unsecured creditor used section 171.255(a) in a creative way in In re
Wool Growers Central Storage Co. to convince a bankruptcy court to re-
ject a plan of reorganization because the plan included a release of direc-
tors for claims, including unsecured creditor claims, brought against the
directors pursuant to the Texas Tax Code. 173 Wool Growers arose out of
a mediation settlement between the debtor, Wool Growers Central Stor-
age Co. ("Wool Growers"), the members of its board, and the official
unsecured creditor's committee by which the directors agreed to pay ap-
proximately $2.5 million in the form of loans to the debtor, which would
be distributed to creditors. Under the plan, the creditors were to receive
sixty to seventy cents on the dollar and the remaining unsecured debt
would be discharged. The settlement included a release of the board of
directors from any claims and causes of action that might be brought
against them by any creditor of the corporation. One unsecured creditor,
Wardlaw Group, who provided mohair to Wool Growers for sale claimed
that the corporation owed it over $250,000. Wardlaw sought payment
from the directors under section 171.255(a) because while it was con-
ducting business Wool Growers forfeited its corporate privileges for fail-
ure to pay its franchise taxes. The corporate privileges were forfeited on
July 9, 2004, and were not reinstated until April 10, 2006. The Wardlaw
170. Martin, 2007 WL 2214502, at *3.
171. Id.
172. Id. at *34.
173. 371 B.R. 768 (N.D. Tex. 2007).
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Group claimed, and the bankruptcy court agreed, that the directors were
individually responsible for contract breaches that occurred after the cor-
porate privileges were forfeited and before they were reinstated. The
court found that those claims belonged entirely to the Wardlaw Group
and not to the estate, and therefore, ruled that they could not be the
subject of any release in connection with the reorganization plan. 174 The
court consequently denied confirmation of the plan. 175
B. THE EVER EXPANDING AND CONTRACTING FIDUCIARY DUTIES
IN THE ZONE OF INSOLVENCY
Texas courts contended with director liability in the zone of insolvency
this Survey period with differing results and little clarity. The viability of
a claim by a creditor for knowing participation in breach of fiduciary du-
ties against investors took an interesting twist in In re I.G. Services,
Ltd.176 In that case, an arbitration panel found in favor of Wells Fargo
Bank in an action brought by the Chapter 11 trustee alleging knowing
participation in breach of fiduciary duty and breach of trust claims. By
court order, the arbitration only applied to the action brought by the es-
tate itself and not to separate claims asserted by individual investors.
Subsequently, the individual investors, through an investor claim trustee,
pursued claims against Wells Fargo Bank again for the very same
claims-knowing participation in breach of fiduciary duties and breach of
trust. Wells Fargo Bank, alleging that the investor's claims against it were
derivative in nature and therefore only properly brought on behalf of the
debtor, sought a ruling that res judicata barred the investor trustee from
proceeding. After providing a thorough background describing the line
of cases addressing zone of insolvency claims by creditors, including a
discussion of the seminal Delaware case on that topic, North American
Catholic Education Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla,177 the
bankruptcy court acknowledged that creditors could not maintain direct
breach of fiduciary duty claims against directors even when the corpora-
tion is in the zone of insolvency because those claims are exclusively de-
rivative in nature.178 The damages sought belonged to the corporate
entity because a knowing breach of fiduciary duty claim hinges on a find-
ing of breach of fiduciary duty, and a breach of fiduciary duty claim can-
not be brought directly by creditors. The court held that because the
174. Id. at 780-81.
175. Id. at 781.
176. No. 04-5041, 2007 WL 2229650 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. July 31, 2007).
177. 930 A.2d 92 (Del. 2007).
178. In re I.G., 2007 WL 2229650, at *34. As illustrated in JetPay Merchant Servs.,
LLC v. Miller, No. 3:07-CV-0950-G, 2007 WL 2701636, at *7 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 17, 2007),
this issue continues to be treated by courts across the country in various ways. Id. In that
case, the Northern District of Texas denied the defendant's motion to dismiss against its
creditors, acknowledging that although under Delaware law officers and directors do not
owe creditors fiduciary duties when a company is insolvent, they do owe such duties under
Colorado law. Id. (citing N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla,
930 A.2d 97, 99 (Del. 2007); Alexander v. Anstine, 152 P.3d 497, 497 (Colo. 2007)).
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claim for knowing breach of fiduciary duty could only be brought on be-
half of the corporation, and the corporation had already done so in the
unsuccessful arbitration, the investor claims trust action was barred by res
judicata.179
Whether fiduciary duties are owed to creditors when a corporation is in
the zone of insolvency was also explored in In re VarTec Telecom, Inc.180
In that case, certain officers and directors moved to dismiss the trustee's
claims for breach of fiduciary duties allegedly owed to creditors while the
debtor was in the zone of insolvency. The officers and directors relied on
Floyd v. Hefner,181 which the bankruptcy court dismissed as a distinguish-
able, an unpublished decision from another jurisdiction. The directors
argued that Floyd clearly held that officers and directors do not owe a
corporation's creditors fiduciary duties when the corporation enters the
vicinity of insolvency. Like the Western District of Texas in In re I. G., the
Texas Northern District Bankruptcy Court reviewed the zone of insol-
vency law from Delaware, including Gheewalla.182 The Northern District
even acknowledged that Gheewalla held that creditors of an insolvent
corporation have standing to maintain derivative claims on behalf of the
corporation.183 Unlike the Western District, however, the Northern Dis-
trict held, without analysis, that a Chapter 7 trustee may bring a deriva-
tive action for breach of fiduciary duty against directors and officers on
behalf of the corporation's creditors.184 Arguably, this holding is inconsis-
tent with Gheewalla, the very case cited by the court. It is unclear
whether the court's language is merely imprecise or if the court intended
to recognize a new fiduciary duty owed to creditors. The court's conclud-
ing discussion, however, certainly indicates an acknowledgement that the
holding extends officers' and directors' duties. 185 Regardless, the lan-
guage found at the end of this case further muddies the legal waters that
both I.G. Services and, ironically, In re VarTec Telecom, indicate
Gheewalla cleared.
C. To COVER OR NOT TO COVER
A discussion of director and officer liability would not be complete
without consideration of insurance coverage. Two cases in particular
touched on coverage issues during this Survey period. The Texas Insur-
179. In re 1G., 2007 WL 2229650, at *34.
180. No. 04-81694-HDH-7, 2007 WL 2872283 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Sept. 24, 2007).
181. No. H-03-5693, 2006 WL 2844245 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2006). Although Floyd was
decided just outside of this Survey period, it is important to note that the Southern District
of Texas in that case ruled that Texas law does not impose a general fiduciary duty on
directors and officers in favor of creditors when the company is in the zone of insolvency.
Id., at *19-20.
182. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92.
183. In re VarTec Telecom, Inc., 2007 WL 2872283, at *3.
184. Id. at *4.
185. Id. (stating that "[tihis Court recognizes that extending officers' and directors' du-
ties to creditors when a corporation nears insolvency creates many issues for such officers
and directors and the professionals providing them advice").
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ance Code section 705.005, which requires an insurer in a rescission ac-
tion to give a ninety-one day notice of its intention to seek rescission to
the insurer, was addressed in another VarTec case, In re VarTec Telecom,
Inc.186 In that case, the insurer, Federal Insurance Company ("FIC"),
filed a declaratory judgment against the defendants, former officers and
directors, seeking rescission of the policy that provided director and of-
ficer coverage. FIC argued that the policy was void ab initio due to al-
leged misrepresentations made by the defendants when applying for
coverage. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss arguing that section
705.005 of the Texas Insurance Code required FIC to provide a ninety-
one day notice of rescission. Conducting a conflicts-of-law analysis, the
district court held that the Texas statute was not applicable because the
insurance policy was created, negotiated, and had a place of performance
in the State of Mississippi, and therefore, in the absence of a choice-of-
law clause, Mississippi law governed. The fact that the defendants were
all citizens of Texas was not sufficient to trigger application of Texas law.
The defendants' motion to dismiss was denied because Mississippi did not
have a similar statute requiring notice.
In the second insurance coverage case, directors and officers of Spe-
cialty Piping Components, Inc., now known as Westcott Holdings, Inc.
("Westcott"), sued the company's insurer for coverage based on the in-
surer's refusal to indemnify the plaintiffs, pursuant to the company's pol-
icy, for the cost of defense incurred in two underlying lawsuits.1 87 The
insurer removed the case to federal court, asserting improper joinder of
one of the plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs filed a motion for remand. The
court acknowledged the heavy burden of demonstrating improper join-
der, particularly when, as in this case, the challenge is that a plaintiff has
improperly joined himself in the case as a plaintiff. The insurer based its
improper-joinder theory on the plaintiffs' alternative assertions that ei-
ther the insurance company owed coverage to Westcott because Westcott
indemnified the officers and directors in the underlying cases, or alterna-
tively, that the insurance company was obligated to pay the officers and
directors directly for the loss they suffered in the underlying litigation.
Through this alternative pleading, the insurer argued that the plaintiffs
had admitted that any proceeds were owed to Westcott, and therefore,
the petition foreclosed any potential recovery for the directors and of-
ficers. The district court disagreed, granting the motion for remand and
finding that plaintiffs may plead inconsistent claims and facts in support
of alternative theories of recovery.188 The district court reasoned that
such alternative pleading does not result in an admission that its claims
are unsupportable. 189
186. No. 07-03056, 2007 WL 2142499 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. July 23, 2007).
187. Westcott Holdings, Inc. v. Monitor Liab. Managers, Inc., No. 8-06-1746, 2006 WL
3041606, at *3-4 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 24, 2006).
188. Id.
189. Id.
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